Hi
As I mentioned in another thread, I wrote an article some time ago on the subject of the "Economic Calculation Argument" associated most strongly with the early 20th century economist, Ludwig von Mises. According to Mises, in the absence of market prices, socialism (or communism or anarchism) would not be able to make economic calculations regarding the allocation of resources. Allocation decisions would be made in the dark, so to speak and would tend to result in a grossly inefficient outcome.
I think the whole argument is a bogus one because it assumes that a communist system of production would be a centrally planned as opposed to being a largely self regulating and decentralised system. The idea of central planning can be attacked on other grounds I think it is only when you reject such a model for communism that you can begin to effectively rebut Mises's claims
I would be very interested to hear the views of comrades on this list on this matter. I would also very much appreciate any critical feedback on the article I wrote http://www.cvoice.org/cv3cox.htm as I am still trying to refine my own ideas
Regards
Robin



Can comment on articles and discussions
You don't deal adequately with the issue of relative preference or desire for things produced by others, that is, outputs of the social economy. The Austrians had argued that preferences, or personal priorities for outcomes of social production, a product of individuals' desires, had to be "transformed" into prices in order to have an efficient economy. This is based on the assumption that an economy is efficient to the extent it satisfies the wants or personal priorities of the population. In the early 19th century this was called "use value" or "utility" but this is somewhat misleading because it is a relational. I've sharpened pencils witha knife but I really prefer a pencil sharpener because it uses up less of the pencil and creates a more even point. Both have "use-value" as methods of prencil-sharpening, but i prefer one over the other.
As far as I can see, your piece never really touches on this. You don't indicate how allocation in an economy is to be tied to preferences or desires. Referring to Maslow's "hierarcy of desires" (which is not a universally accepted theory of needs) only talks about "need" in the abstract. But what people want is not "food" in the abstract, but particular foods -- a pizza tonite, oat cereal with milk for breakfast, kung pao chicken for lunch, and so on, and particular things that are used as ingredients. Wants for food vary from person to person, from time to time, and from culture to culture. You can't infer these wants from an abstract concept of "need". Indeed, your talk of Maslow's theory of needs being a basis of allocation could suggest to someone that you have in mind a highly paternalistic idea of certain people deciding "on our behalf" what is going to be produced for us. And that would be a gross violation of self-management -- having control over the decisions that affect us. And self-management, in this sense, is also a human need. But there is nothing in your article that recognizes self-management over consumption in the sense of linking people's decisions about what they want to allocation.
You are right that market prices are not an accurate "transformation" of subjective preferences, and that quote from Pigou is an excellent attack on this notion. However, you assume that subjective preferences, or priorities that reflect personal desire, cannot be transformed into prices. From the fact that markets do not do this effectively, it does not follow it can't be done. Participatory planning was devised by radical economists like Pat Devine and Robin Hahnel precisely to do exactly this....to transform preferences into prices that do accurately reflect personal priorities or desires.
You mention in passing that there is an "epistemological" component to the argument of the Austrian economists but you don't go into this. Basically, Mises and Hayek argued that an effective economy needs to draw out through social interaction a lot of "tacit knowledge" including information about the priorities or relative desires people have for various products or outcomes. Part of the argument against centrally planned socialism is that it provides an incentive for workers and managers to lie, to deceive the central authorities about their aims and capacities. Pat Devine and Fikret Adaman argue that capitalism also fails to draw out "tacit knowledge" because workers also have an incentive to not cooperate or to lie to their bosses. There have been a lot of studies that show that productivity increases to the degree workers control production, because they start to let down their guard about being screwed. The argument of Devine and Adaman is in their article "Lessons from the Calculation Debate":
http://www3.sympatico.ca/bernard.leask/renewal.html
But you don't show how tacit knowledge about people's priorities is to be drawn out. In the participatory planning proposals of Pat Devine and Robin Hahnel, this knowledge is drawn out through a socially interactive process in which residents of communities make an initial series of requests for what they want produced, and community assemblies make decisions about what initial requests they want for public goods (parks, child care, housing, whatever). Through a process of negotiation with production groups, projected prices are developed through people showing how strongly they want things. But this only works because individuals and communities have finite budgets -- a finite entitlement to consume, or make demands on the social system of production. Under your proposal, however, everything is distributed free with no apparent limits so there is no limit on a budget. The problem with free distribution is that it makes it impossible to draw out from people the "tacit knowledge" of how much they prefer various possible alternatives.
But the thing is, we can't really know the social opportunity costs of the various possibilities without knowing what people want. You suggest various possible schemes for efficient allocation. But I'll point out to you that the problem with all of them is that they never tie back to what people desire. For example, you infer from some principle about plant ecosystems that the scarcest component should be economized on. This will not guarantee efficiency. That's because you don't know how important this component is in terms of the desires of the population. Something could be scarce but of little importance. Argon may be a scarce element but how important is it to us?
This means you do in fact need to make all possible inputs commensurable in terms of a measure of human priorities. And that's where prices come into play. But as the example of participatory planning shows, prices need not be formed by a market. There are other potential forms of social interaction that can draw out the tacit information about people's priorities that gets encapsulated in a price system.
Another thing you fail to consider is the issue of a plausible system of incentives. If there is no system of reward for work effort, if able-bodied adults are not required to do socially useful work to earn an entitlement to consume, it's unlikely there will be adequate incentives to do the work people need to have done. If incomes are equal, then the argument against prices that you articulate doesn't apply. Prices can measure intensity of desire between different people accurately if their rate of remuneration is the same.
t.